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Contesting Circuits of Empire: Afro-Caribbean Migrant Labor in Cuba, 1899-1958
Samuel Finesurrey
In December 1914, New York Financier and unofficial U.S. consul to Haiti Roger L.
Farnham, helped convince Secretary of State Williams Jennings Bryan to send U.S. Marines into
Haiti’s Banque Nationale. Farnham made off with the modern equivalent of $2.66 million
dollars, which he deposited in National City Bank of New York where he served as Vice
President. i Predictably, Haiti defaulted on its debt payments, which became part of the
justification for the U.S. occupation of the nation lasted from 1915-1934.
The island that had been independent since the ousting of the French in a slave revolt
over 100 years earlier, was now occupied by the United States. U.S. officials imposed upon
Haitians a puppet President, the liquidation of their self-governing apparatus and a U.S. trained
and managed police force. Haiti’s infrastructure projects were built largely for foreign capital,
under U.S. military or corporate supervision, and by exploited Haitian labor. The nation’s roads
were built by Haitians conscripted to work for U.S. army engineers and paid literally nothing.ii In
Senate testimony Farnham revealed that occasionally Haitians conscripted to infrastructure
projects were shot for attempting to escape. A few minutes later the bank executive lamented the
difficulty he encountered in overcoming trust issues between Haitians and their U.S. occupiers.
Farnham explained that Haitians worried that under the U.S. occupation “they would be made
slaves. That is the fear that is uppermost in the minds of Haitians, as ignorant as they are.” iii
Farnham also served as President of the National Railroad of Haiti, an unusable and
unfinished network of rail; he forced the Haitian government to pay him for the useless rail
lines.iv The railroad was designed to connect ports to coal deposits and agricultural regions
deemed by Farnham to have potential for commercial enterprise.v To be clear, these tracks were

not designed to connect a nation of people, but laid to capitalize on the extraction of resources. In
the era of dollar diplomacy, Wall Street bankers like Farnham saw the Caribbean Basin as an
open investment opportunity where the accumulation of capital would not be curbed by national
borders, national sovereignty or the dignity of Caribbean workers.vi
During Cuba’s Republican Era, Anglo-American executives in Cuba exploited the
networks of formal and informal empire to transport and employ workers from Haiti, as well as
those from the Spanish and English-speaking Caribbean. The imperial appropriation of labor in
pursuit of capital throughout the Caribbean altered the demographics, politics and culture of the
region.vii Mostly U.S. corporations brought Afro-Caribbean workers to Cuba to advance their
corporate and geopolitical ambitions, with deeply racialized consequences. Afro-Caribbean
migrants, unlike their Anglo-American bosses, faced reprisals from the Cuban government in the
1920s, 1930s and 1940s when tens of thousands were deported back to their respective
homelands due to the perception that they were competing with Cuban workers and lowering
Cuban wages. This paper traces how U.S. corporations exploited U.S. and British empire in the
Caribbean to consolidate influence and augment profits in Cuba. Through oral histories, archival
research and a review of the existing scholarship this paper unveils the construction and
contestation of Cuba’s ethnonational hierarchies.
The Caribbean Comes to Cuba: The Long Arm of U.S. Imperialism
While Cuba certainly was not the only destination for Afro-Caribbean migrants in the
early 20th century, it attracted a significant number of Afro-Caribbean workers due to the island’s
deep political and economic entanglements with the United States. After 1899 wealthy Cubans
partnered with Anglo-American investors in pursuit of capital. viii Out of self-interest, Cuban
political leaders including Presidents José Miguel Gómez (1909-1913), Mario García Menocal

(1913-1921), Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), and Carlos Mendieta (1934-35) encouraged the
consolidation of a sugar economy in part because they all worked as owners or high-ranking
employees of Cuban or U.S. sugar mills in Cuba.ix
Anglo-American and Cuban executives on the island profited by keeping their workforce
divided along ethnonational lines and the legal status of their workers tenuous. Cuban politicians
lined their own pockets and those of U.S. sugar corporations by sanctioning the migration of
Afro-Caribbean labor. Hundreds of thousands of Afro-Caribbean workers arrived through private
ports owned by companies including the Cuban-American Sugar Company and the United Fruit
and Sugar Company. Many Cuban officials pursued a policy of plausible deniability by granting
foreign companies control over how many people entered the country, where they lived and
worked, and how many remained (legally or illegally) in Cuba.x This made Afro-Caribbean labor
in Cuba extremely vulnerable to the whims of their employers.
Many of the hundreds of thousands of British Caribbean workers who arrived in Cuba,
through both private and public ports in the first decades of the 20th century, were seasonal
workers, laboring through the sugar harvest and then returning home. After the abolition of
slavery in the British Caribbean, Indian and Chinese workers came to their islands as contract
labor to continue a tradition of exploited cane-cutters on large plantations. xi With U.S. capital in
search of English-speaking labor at the turn of the 20 th century, these British Afro-Caribbean
workers found substantial opportunities outside of their islands of birth. After the completion of
the Panama Canal in 1914, many West Indians resettled with large U.S. companies like the
United Fruit and Sugar Company in Central America and Cuba. xii
West Indians who arrived through public ports were technically secured a relatively
protected status as British Subjects, but when in need, West Indians often found the British

authorities unresponsive to their plight. xiii In August 1941, John Sawyer, a concerned North
American lawyer, wrote the British Foreign Office about the desperate situation of West Indians
at the Cuban American Sugar Company mill town of Delicias. Trying to draw attention to the
crisis from those in the Foreign Office, Sawyer wrote, “England has hundreds of Subjects housed
in Central Delicias [SIC] in an old fallen down Barracks in a very poor condition with very bad
sanitary conditions, a great many on the verge of starvation, and many others just slowly starving
to death.”xiv Looking into the matter H.A. Hobson of the British Colonial Office admitted the
situation was “deplorable,” but determined nothing could be done. xv Despite hundreds of years of
colonization, and over a century after the abolition of slavery, in the eyes of their British
colonizers, West Indians remained expendable, even as these Afro-Caribbean workers faced
harassment from Cubans and Haitians who accused them of ‘British arrogance.’xvi
The U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) set the context for the population of largely
uneducated Haitian laborers to serve foreign and domestic sugar corporations in Cuba. Haiti’s
proximity to eastern Cuba, and the oppressive influence of the United States, made Haitian
workers both accessible and vulnerable to the exploitative tactics of U.S. employers working less
than 60 miles away in Cuba. In the early 1900s, U.S. contracting agents recruited Haitian labor
for work in the cane-fields of Cuba.xvii The United Fruit and Sugar Company and other large
sugar companies paid contractors to find for them Haitian braceros. Placing a middle man
between themselves and their workers, sugar corporations could wash their hands of the
suffering these migrants endured. xviii
Haitian migrants generally occupied the bottom rung of rural Cuban society. Lack of
literacy combined with an inability to communicate with U.S. executives and their fellow
Cubans. With often tenuous legal status Haitians were extremely vulnerable to exploitation and

wage theft. Locked in their roles as cane-cutters and denied paths toward social mobility, their
vulnerability made them prized employees for U.S. executives in Cuba.xix
In the 1920s, a labor shortage developed in Haiti. This was a decade in which close to
100,000 Haitians immigrated to Cuba. xx Despite frequent mistreatment in Cuba, the work on the
island to the northwest proved preferable to many Haitians than their lives under the U.S.
occupation in their home nation.
Afro-Caribbean Hierarchies in Cuba
Cuban leaders who profited from Anglo-American influence typically looked the other
way as foreign laborers were brought in to meet the needs of U.S. corporations. Even worse,
Cuban powerbrokers would, as needed, scapegoat migrant labor to manage potential unrest
among Cuban workers who were suffering. Declared a threat to Cuban workers, Afro-Caribbean
labor became particular vulnerable to the anti-immigrant nationalist purges of the 1920s, 1930s
and 1940s.xxi Drawn to Cuba by foreign and domestic executives and forced to mold to local
conditions to fit corporate needs, these same workers were vilified and sacrificed by Cuban
powerbrokers when the Cuban economy weakened.
Afro-Caribbean migrants, and especially Haitians braceros faced significant persecution
in Cuba after the collapse of the sugar economy in the 1920s and the global depression in the
1930s. In 1928 over 15,000 antillanos were deported, the majority of whom came from Haiti. In
October 1933, the revolutionary government of President Ramón Grau San Martín issued Decree
2232, declaring all destitute foreigners deportable. Grau’s Decree 2583 mandated that all
corporate enterprises must have at least a 50% Cuban workforce. xxii These two decrees preceded
the deportation of 8,000 Haitians during Grau’s short rule between 1933-1934.xxiii Thus, even
before the U.S. occupation of Haiti ended in 1934, Haitians in Cuba became targets of anti-

immigrant campaigns. Their U.S. occupiers did next to nothing to protect them. While Haitians
remained the prime target of this anti-immigrant legislation, these decrees undermined workingclass and transnational solidarity by pitting desperate peoples against each other. Destitute Cuban
laborers, including black Cubans, often accused Afro-Caribbean migrants of undermining both
wages and job security.
While both West Indians and Haitians suffered under the anti-immigrant policies of the
20s, 30s and 40s, the two groups faced distinct legal challenges in Cuba. Though they were often
inadequate, the efforts to secure decency for British West Indians in Cuba by the British
Government could not be fully ignored by Cuban authorities. Afro-Caribbean populations from
Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and St. Lucia remained British Subjects until those islands
achieved independence in the 1960s, after the Cuban Revolution took power. By contrast, the
Cuban government significantly and publicly disrespected Haiti’s diplomats; the delegation was
not even informed of a new Cuban policy of deportation in 1937, which targeted Haitian
migrants in Cuba.xxiv The status of British Caribbean Subjects, while still precarious, proved far
more secure than the status of the Haitian migrants in Cuba.
West Indian familiarity with British customs and an English-language education provided
greater opportunities for their social mobility in Cuba than immigrants from Haiti or the Spanish
Caribbean including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and even, at times, Cubans. West Indians easily
and comfortably communicated with British and U.S. executives. While a large percentage
worked as cane-cutters, West Indians were commonly offered more secure positions as domestic
servants, interpreters, nurses, mill workers, or ministers. These positions proved more lucrative
and less physically demanding than cane-cutting.xxv

A wide gap in literacy rates separated the Haitians from the British West Indian migrant
population. The vast majority of Haitians arriving in Cuba in the 1910s and 1920s were
illiterate.xxvi By contrast just 9.3 percent of all British West Indians in Cuba were unable to read
or write, rendering them more literate than the Cuban population.xxvii Anglo-American
agricultural executive George Harper explained, “Of all the nationalities the Haitians were the
least educated…The Jamaicans were the most educated, to such an extent that they usually quit
after a few days.”xxviii These trends continued over time: the children of Haitians in Cuba were
generally unable to attend school while British West Indians often found schools for their
children through the Anglo-American dominated Episcopal Church in Cuba.
British colonialism augmented the desirability and availability of West Indian laborers
for Anglo-American employers. This advantage paid dividends for migrants from the British
Caribbean at Guantanamo Naval Base. In the 1920s and 1930s Puerto Ricans, who were U.S.
citizens, expressed frustration that they had more trouble securing positions at the GTMO than
West Indians who spoke English as their first language. xxix The Haitian community surrounding
the base faced even greater obstacles securing positions to service U.S. Naval personnel, even
during the U.S. occupation of Haiti. Both Puerto Ricans and Haitians learned painfully that the
ability to accommodate white U.S. citizens trumped their political and legal status as non-white
and non-English-speaking U.S. citizens or subjects.
British Caribbean workers were often preferred as domestic servants for Anglo-American
executives and diplomats throughout the island who did not speak Spanish. Margaret Benson
came to Cuba when Esso Oil Company moved the family down in the mid-1950s. Esso was an
English-speaking business environment. Margaret explained: “The reasons we hired the
Jamaican was because they spoke English and Spanish…. It was easier for mom.” xxx Many

privileged Anglo-American residents in Cuba lived in segregated settings, never learned Spanish
and depended on their British West Indian servants to communicate with the outside world.xxxi
West Indians’ ability to accommodate Anglo-American executives and their families
created opportunities for limited social mobility, as well as some personal protections. Charles
Ray, originally from St. Lucia, was fluent in English and therefore able to communicate
effectively with Anglo-American management at the Cuban American Sugar Company. Hired
originally as a cart driver in the mill town of Chaparra earning $1.25 a day, after his father spoke
to the mill manager, English-speaking Ray was placed in the lab. Ray remembers his own
promotion from the lab when he encountered a U.S. chemist who did not speak Spanish. Ray
explains, “He chose me to work with them there, as an interpreter.” This very same North
American chemist helped Ray forge his birth certificate to prevent deportation during the antiAfro-Cuban purges of the late 1920s and 1930s. The altered document claimed Ray was Cuban
so that he could maintain employment at the mill.xxxii Within a highly stratified social hierarchy,
British Caribbean Subjects were afforded privileges that non-British-subject Caribbean laborers
in Cuba were not.
The Afro-Caribbean Diaspora Contests Empire
Despite their distinct colonial biographies and treatment within Cuba, both Haitian and
West Indian immigrants confronted severe exploitation and hostility in Cuba, from the Cuban
government, corporate executives and from other workers.xxxiii A wave of anti-immigration laws
criminalized large swaths of this community as Cubans themselves struggled in times of
hardship. In response, Afro-Caribbean workers mobilized, resisted and contested harsh
conditions in a number of ways.

The racialized experience of West Indian veterans in Europe who fought alongside the
English during the World Wars left these men suspicious of the British government. Many no
longer placed their faith in a continued relationship with England. Decrying the condition of
British West Indian workers in Cuba, in 1938 WWI veteran Theophilus Samms from Central
Victoria in Santa Clara wrote to the Colonial Secretary in London,
We have always been obedient to you and at any time of your distress. Many of our boys
had been to your rescue in the world’s war. Some of whom were slain in that battle.
Others have returned to us and among them many are here [in Cuba] suffering the
unconstitutional laws of the land. Why should our Emperor which is mighty not only in
army and navy but a government that has billions of Pounds allow us to be here under
these ferocious [illegible]. Why should you continue to purchase such a vast amount of
Cuban Product? xxxiv
Frustrated with English inaction, Samms warned, “Remember Russia in the World War.” xxxv
West Indians in Cuba began to question the value of their continued colonial ties with England.
Eventually—and inadequately—British officials responded to the conditions exposed by
advocates like Samms. In a 1943 report issued by Sir Frank Stockdale, the British government
laid out plans to relieve the West Indians in Cuba. Implemented over the course of two decades,
10,000 pounds annually would finance agricultural projects, as well as subsidize welfare for the
elderly and those without work.xxxvi By the 1950s some of this money would be funneled through
the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation of Havana to support a burial center for “colored
nationals.” xxxvii Another sign of disrespect to the Afro-Caribbean community in Cuba, white
U.S., British and Canadian residents who were unaffiliated with the British Embassy became the
legitimate, entrusted authorities who could allocate funds for the West Indian community.
Segregation by sugar companies strategically separated workers by ethnicity, language
and country of origin, in terms of where they lived and worked, making it difficult for workers to
unite in cross-cultural opposition to the policies of respective corporations. And yet there is

evidence of transnational organizing by Afro-Caribbean laborers in Eastern Cuba. British West
Indian and Haitian braceros participated in strikes and seizures in late 1933 at a number of sugar
mills, including the United Fruit and Sugar Company mills at Boston and Preston. Haitian
laborers on Oriente's coffee estates ceased work as well. The nationalist purges of the Grau
government in 1933 effectively undermined this transnational working-class solidarity.xxxviii Still,
organizing continued in a variety of forms among Afro-Caribbean workers.
The status of West Indians in Cuba remained precarious both legally and economically.
In response, British Caribbean workers sought to organize themselves. Fifty-two branches of
Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Associations (UNIA) were started in Cuba, with
one of the world’s largest and longest lasting chapter established in Banes, Oriente on United
Fruit and Sugar Company property. xxxix The pan-Africanist movement developed through UNIA
and cultivated support networks by pooling the resources of the British Afro-Caribbean
community to provide limited comfort for colonized subjects away from home. British
Caribbean Subjects further organized the distribution of foreign residency cards, a sick fund,
educational funds and worked to secure the legal status of their fellow West Indians in Cuba.
They worked with the Salvation Army and the British Government to secure temporary cost-free
room and board for West Indian migrants in need.xl
More than any other Afro-Caribbean group in Cuba, Haitians faced severe challenges
throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. In response Haitians developed networks through which
they exchanged information to secure safety, better wages and fairer treatment in Cuba. Haitian
contractors, at times, informed cane-cutters about opportunities for higher pay scales and better
working conditions on other plantations.xli During immigrant crackdowns Haitians took refuge in
rural communities, outside the reach of Cuban authorities.xlii

Conclusions
Despite being abused by the networks of formal and informal empire and sacrificed by
Cuban politicians, Afro-Caribbean immigrants to Cuba carved a space for themselves, altering
the island and the Caribbean basin in the process. With the threat of deportation diminishing
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Afro-Caribbean population survived on the island. More
than 27,000 people of Haitian descent remained in Cuba in 1953.xliii Most of the nearly 15,000
people in Cuba from British Commonwealth in the 1953 census were Afro-Caribbean British
Subjects.xliv Exploited by the Cuban government, U.S. corporations and discriminated against by
fellow workers, these Afro-Caribbean laborers organized and resisted, helping to destabilize
Cuban social and economic arrangements, contributing to the rise of revolutionary socioeconomic and political changes after 1959.
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